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genes on the web — direct-to-consumer marketing of genetic testing

directly to consumers. In addition
to testing for both the relatively
common factor V Leiden gene mutation and the uncommon gene
for Canavan’s disease, these companies provide tests as mundane
as a cholesterol screening panel.
But they serve only as a front end;
federal regulations prohibit them
from performing the tests themselves. The diagnostic laboratories they use must be certified according to the Clinical Laboratory
Improvement Amendments, which
specify that results must be reported to the ordering clinician
— not to the consumer. So each
online testing company has an arrangement with a physician whose

name is used to order the tests and
receive the results from the labs.
There are also numerous Internet-based companies that market
tests for ancestral origin or that
determine whether two persons
are related on the basis of polymerase-chain-reaction testing for
variability in the Y chromosome
or mitochondrial DNA. Some companies also market noninvasive
tests for fetal sex based on the
analysis of fetal DNA in the maternal circulation, although one
of these companies, Acu-Gen Biolab of Massachusetts, is facing
litigation stemming from testing
inaccuracies.
Sharon Plon, chief of the Can-

cer Genetics Clinic at the Baylor
College of Medicine in Houston,
sums up the wariness of many
physicians with regard to online
genetic testing: “My biggest concern,” she says, “is that members
of the public are getting tests that
they don’t understand, and their
physicians may not understand,
and they may be making big decisions that are ill-informed.”
On July 27, 2006, the Federal
Trade Commission issued a consumer alert in an effort to address
such concerns as well as privacy
protection.
Dr. Wolfberg is a fellow in maternal fetal
medicine at Tufts–New England Medical
Center, Boston.
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“W

ho am I?” has always
been a fundamental philosophical question that may require decades of reflection to answer. With the advent of DNA
analysis, there is a growing public impression that the answer may
be found in our genes. Various Internet sites offer descriptions of
our ancestral history on the basis
of our DNA, as well as testing for
specific “disease genes” or general profiles that are used to recommend lifestyle changes, such
as foods to be eaten or avoided.
Researchers have even suggested
that although the scientific evidence is speculative and at best
probabilistic, many people will
want to have their DNA analyzed
for markers of predispositions toward certain behaviors, including risk taking, overeating, aggression, and even criminality.1,2
As these opportunities to learn
about our DNA expand and affect
the way we construct our personal
identities, we should be alert to

the risks as well as the benefits of
exploring our DNA and basing an
understanding of who we are on
genetic testing. We should be wary
of perceptions of ourselves —
whether our own or others’ — that
are based on results of tests that
have not been validated or on misinterpretations of valid tests. We
should be at least as concerned
that others may know more than
we do about our own genetic
makeup. DNA analysis, in combination with the Internet, creates
an unregulated market in DNA
and new opportunities for invasions of genetic privacy.
Using the Internet for the marketing and purchasing of genetic
tests sidesteps the doctor–patient
relationship and eliminates meaningful, face-to-face genetic counseling. It also magnifies an older
but unresolved danger: whenever
identifiable DNA samples are collected and stored, there is a high
risk that violations of genetic privacy will follow. As the evolution
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of DNA banking for research demonstrates, DNA donors shouldn’t
assume that the privacy protections they take for granted in
medical care and clinical research
apply. People give up more than
they realize when they hand over
their DNA.
DNA collection and banking
have already gone through two
distinct stages. Initially, the people most actively involved in DNA
collection (outside law enforcement and the U.S. military, both
of which use DNA for identification purposes only) were researchers seeking genetic markers for a
particular disease, who typically
collected DNA samples from families at risk for the disease of interest and stored those samples.
Consent forms typically contained
a provision permitting the researchers to retain and reanalyze
DNA samples in related research
after the primary study was completed. In the next iteration, consent documents included much
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broader statements in which subjects acknowledged that their DNA
samples would become the property of the researchers (or institutions), who could control the
samples for their own benefit.
The research subject was thereby
transformed into a DNA donor.3
Recent years have seen the
emergence of private companies,
such as the Ardais Corporation
and DNA Sciences, that — either
at hospitals or through appeals
over the Internet — collect and
analyze samples and personal information for the express purpose
of selling them to researchers.
The National Institutes of Health
also has plans to develop a national repository similar to the U.K.
Biobank, a new resource for researchers that will eventually include information and blood samples from 500,000 volunteers. With
such developments, DNA banking
is quickly changing from an academic research activity to a governmental and commercial enterprise conducted by DNA brokers.
As a result, the relationship between subjects and researchers
is being severed, and along with
it the associated legal rights and
obligations, including obligations
to reduce risks to subjects’ privacy
and to maintain the confidentiality of their information. The unresolved legal status of the relationships among donors, brokers,
and researchers raises troubling
questions about privacy and property rights.
Without adequate protections
for genetic privacy, autonomy to
discover and use one’s own genetic information for one’s own
purposes cannot be realized. A
fundamental concern is that the
possession and storage of a personally identifiable DNA sample
give the possessor access to a
wealth of information about the
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person and his or her genetic relatives. This includes information
derivable from new DNA tests that
were not available, or even anticipated, when the sample was relinquished. Consequently, as long
as personally identifiable DNA
samples are stored, there is the
possibility of unauthorized access
to and use of genetic information
— an invasion of genetic privacy.
To the extent that we see ourselves
and our future as influenced by
our genes, such invasions can disrupt our very sense of self.4
In response to this concern, a
majority of states have begun to
regulate genetic testing and fair
uses of genetic information. But
these laws are almost exclusively
antidiscrimination statutes that
target the behavior of insurers,
employers, or both after the DNA
has been collected and analyzed.
Some states, such as New Jersey,
include broader privacy protections by prohibiting unconsentedto collection and testing of DNA
generally (although those statutes
typically include broad exceptions
for law enforcement and medical
research) and by defining requirements for consent to testing. Only
about half a dozen states, however, require either explicit consent for sample storage or the
destruction of samples after the
purpose for their collection has
been achieved.
It is, of course, the DNA sample itself, which can usefully be
viewed as a coded probabilistic
medical record, that makes genetic privacy unique and differentiates it from the privacy of medical
records.5 The absence of any meaningful property or privacy protection of DNA samples means that
consumers must be extra cautious
and seek specific information
about the fate of the samples before sending them off for testing.
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Minimal information that they
should obtain includes the site
where the sample will be analyzed,
whether and how long it will be
stored, and who will have access
to it and to any identifiable information linked to it. The best
consumer advice, given current
law, is that one should not send
a DNA sample to anyone who does
not guarantee to destroy it on
completion of the specified test.
Redefining ourselves and our
futures in accordance with insights offered by our DNA is
hopelessly reductionistic, if inherently fascinating. We will not
learn who we are by having our
DNA analyzed, but we will almost
certainly give others the opportunity to learn something about us.
And our DNA is not like our credit cards: we cannot simply get a
new number. As long as someone
has our identifiable DNA sample,
he or she will be able to learn
things about us we may not know,
may not want to know, and certainly don’t want others to know.
DNA collection, banking, and
analysis are expanding rapidly,
and we need a federal genetic
privacy law to protect people who
want to know what secrets their
DNA contains, as well as those
who don’t.
An interview with Prof. Annas can be heard
at www.nejm.org.
Ms. Roche and Mr. Annas are professors in
the Department of Health Law, Bioethics,
and Human Rights at Boston University
School of Public Health, Boston.
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